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PROTECTING ACCESS TO EXTRACURRICULAR ACTIVITIES:
THE NEED TO RECOGNIZE A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO A
MINIMALLY ADEQUATE EDUCATION

I. INTRODUCTION

Extracurricular activities provide an important source of education
for high school students. According to former President Ronald Reagan,
extracurricular activities afford students "valuable opportunities to
discover and develop talent in areas other than those covered within the
classroom." 1 Indeed, empirical research shows that extracurricular
activities have a far-reaching and positive impact on schoolchildren?
Students who participate in high school extracurricular activities, for
example, are more likely to have good school attendance records, high
grade-point averages, and aspirations for education beyond high school. 3
Also, students who participate in extracurricular activities are less likely
to engage in a variety of risky behaviors. 4 These school-sponsored
activities occupy students' idle time, strengthen their commitment to
school, and expose them to beneficial peer and adult influences. 5
In addition, participation in high school extracurricular activities
may be an indicator of future career achievement. 6 Students who are
I. Exec. Prod. 5109,48 Fed. Reg. 44749 (Sept. 30, 1983).
2. Br. of Amici Curiae Am. Acad. of Pediatrics et al. at 9, Bd. ofEduc. of lndep. Sch. Dist. No.
92 of l'ottawatomie County v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002) (citing jacquelynne S. Eccles & Bonnie L.
Barber, Student Council, Volunteering, Basketball, or Marching Band: What Kind of Extracurricular
Involvement Matters?, 14 j. Adolescent Research 25 (1999) (finding "clear evidence" that
participation in extracurricular activities provides higher than expected GPAs)); joseph L. Mahoney
& Robert B. Cairns, Do Extracurricular Activities Protect Against Early School Dropout?, 33 Dev.
Psycho!. 241 ( 1997) (finding that participation in extracurricular activities protects against early
school dropout).
3. Natl. Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, Extracurricular Participation and Student Engagement
<http:/ in ccs.ed.gov/pubscarch/pubsinfo.asp?pubid=957 41 > (June 1995) [hereinafter Extracurricular
Participation J.
4. Nicholas Zill, Christine Winquist Nord & Laura Spencer Loomis, Adolescent Time Use,
Risky Behavior and Outcomes: An Analysis of National Data <http:/ /aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/cyp
/xstirnusc.htm> (Sept. 11, 1995).
5. !d.
6. Br. of Amici Curiae, supra n. 2, at 9; Natl. Fedn. of St. High Sch. Assns., The Casef(Jr High
School A clivi ties <http:/ /www.nths.org/ scriptcontent/V a_ custom/va_cm/ con ten tpagedisplay.cfm?
content_lll=l63> (accessed Mar. 23, 2004).
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involved in such activities are more likely to succeed at their chosen
professions and make positive contributions to their communities. 7 On
the other hand, students who do not participate are 57 percent more
likely to drop out of high school by the time they are seniors, 49 percent
more likely to have used drugs, 37 percent more likely to have become
teen parents, 35 percent more likely to have smoked cigarettes, and 27
percent more likely to have been arrested. 8
Given the proven benefits that come from participation in
extracurricular activities, it is no surprise that 99.8 percent of the nation's
high schools offer some variety of these educational activities. 9 About 80
percent of high school seniors participate in at least one of the
extracurricular activities offered at their schools. 10 Therefore, it is
apparent that the term "extracurricular activities" is a misnomer.
Instead, it is more appropriate to consider such activities as a standard
and integral part of a student's education rather than imply that they are
unimportant and supplementary.
Despite widespread participation in high school extracurricular
activities and the myriad of benefits derived from them, the United States
Supreme Court has twice ruled that a school district may limit or
condition access to these important educational opportunities. First, in
Vernonia School District 47! v. Acton, 11 the Court upheld a school policy
that conditioned the opportunity to participate in interscholastic athletics
on a student's submission to random urinalysis drug testing. 12 Next, in
Board of Education of Independent School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie
County v. Earls, 13 the Court expanded the reach of Vernonia by
upholding the constitutionality of a policy that required all students who
participate in any extracurricular activity to submit to a drug-testing
regime. 14
Placing such a prerequisite upon extracurricular participation can
have the dire result of depriving certain schoolchildren of important
educational opportunities whether or not they are using illegal drugs. 15

The Case for High School Activities, supra n. 6.
8. Zill, supra n. 4.
9. Extracurricular Participation, supra n. 3 (Extracurricular offerings include participation in
various school publications, performing arts, athletics, honor societies, student government,
academic clubs, vocational clubs, service clubs, and hobby clubs.).
10. Id.
11. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47] v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
12. ld. at. 652-66.
13. Ed. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822
(2002).
7.

14. Id. at 837-38.
15. See Br. of Amici Curiae, supra n. 2, at 4, 20. Non-drug users may choose not to participate
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Faced with the decision of whether to submit to drug testing or foregoing
extracurricular activities, schoolchildren are forced to engage in a crude
cost-benefit analysis. They must decide whether their participation in
extracurricular activities is worth tolerating an intrusion upon their
privacy. 16 The records of Earls and other cases plainly suggest that some
students will opt not to be subjected to a drug test at the expense oflosing
their eligibility for involvement in extracurricular activities. 17
The Supreme Court was able to rule the way it did in Vernonia and
Earls because education is not yet considered to be a fundamental right. 18
A statute or rule that infringes on a fundamental right is subject to
heightened scrutiny by the courts. 19 As such, interference with a
fundamental right will only be tolerated where the government employs
necessary means to address a "compelling state interest." 20 Thus, the
policies in Vernonia and Earls would likely have been struck down if the
Court had previously recognized a fundamental right to education that
encompassed extracurricular activities. 21 Instead, the Court allowed two
school districts to deprive certain students of access to educational
in extracurricular activities because they find that the administration of a drug test infringes too far
upon their sense of modesty and privacy. Id. at 19-21. For example, some students who were
subject to the policy in Earls "expressed embarrassment over the drug-testing procedure." Earls v.
Bd. Of Educ. of Tecumseh Pub. Sch. Dist.. 115 F. Supp. 2d. 12S1, 1291 (2000), rev'd, 536 U.S. 822
(2002) [hereinafter Tecumseh]. Those students who do in fact use drugs may also choose to refrain
from participation in extracurricular activities instead of submitting to a drug-testing regime. Br. of
Amici Curiae, supra note 2, at 20. justice Ginsburg noted in her Earls dissent that "even if students
might be deterred from drug use in order to preserve their extracurricular eligibility, it is at least as
likely that other students might forgo their extracurricular involvement in order to avoid detection of
their drug use." 536 U.S. at 853 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
16. Br. of Amici Curiae, supra n. 2, at 19-20.
17. The Tecumseh record shows that one student told a teacher that she chose to stop
participating in choir because of the drug-testing policy. 115 F. Supp. 2d at 1291 n. 38. See also
Penn-Harris-Madison Sch. Corp. v. Joy, 768 N.E.2d 940, 943-44 (Ind. App. 2002) (Students refused to
sign consent form for random, suspicionless drug testing required to participate in extracurricular
activities or to receive a parking permit.); Weber v. Oakridge Sch. Dist. 76, 56 P.3d 504, 506 (Or. App.
2002) (student who chose not to consent to random urinalysis testing prevented from playing on
volleyball team); Trinidad Sch. Dist. No. I v. Lopez, 963 P.2d 1095, 1097 (Colo. 1998) (student
suspended from participation in marching band because he chose not to consent to the school's
mandatory drug policy); Tannahill ex rei. Tannahill v. Lockney Ind. Sch. Dist., 133 F. Supp. 2d 919,
922-23 (N.D. Tex. 2001) (refusal to consent to drug testing resulted in suspension from all
extracurricular activities); Acton v. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47], 796 F. Supp. 1354, 1359 (D. Or. 1992),
vacated, 515 U.S. 646 (1995) (seventh grade student who refused to sign a consent form for drug and
alcohol testing prohibited from participation in district-sponsored athletics).
18. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I, 35 (1973) (Education "is not
among the rights afforded explicit protection under our federal Constitution. Nor do we find any
basis for saying it is implicitly so protected.") [hereinafter San Antonio].
19. Russell W. Galloway, Jr., Basic Substantive Due Process Analysis, 26 U.S.F. L. Rev. 625, 627
(1992).
20. !d.
21. See infra Part V.
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opportunities that would have provided them with short- and long-term
benefits. Since the Earls decision in June 2002, school districts across the
country have implemented policies that call for urinalysis testing of
students for the use of drugs, alcohol, and even tobacco. 22 As a result, an
increasing number of students, whether or not they use illicit substances,
are being blocked from access to activities that would enrich their lives.
Despite its rulings in Vernonia and Earls, the Supreme Court, has
explicitly left open the possibility that some minimal level of education is
in fact constitutionally protectedY The Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment provides a constitutional basis for the
recognition of this right. 24 In addition, the recent decision in Lawrence v.
Texas 25 demonstrates a new willingness by the Court to interpret the
Due Process Clause more broadly to protect rights that are not explicitly
enumerated in the Constitution. 26
Hence, should the Court be
confronted again with the question of whether the Constitution
guarantees a right to education, it is now more likely to recognize a
fundamental right to a minimally adequate education.
While some commentators have argued for the recognition of a
fundamental right to a minimally adequate education, 27 they have not
addressed the important issue of whether extracurricular activities would
be protected by the acknowledgment of this right. This Note will
demonstrate why the Supreme Court should recognize a fundamental
right to a minimally adequate education. This Note will also argue that
this fundamental right should be broad enough to protect students'
access to extracurricular activities. Part II details the treatment of
education as a fundamental right under state and federal law. Part III
suggests that the Court may now be ready to recognize this right in the
wake of the Lawrence decision. Part IV points to the constitutional bases
for the recognition of a fundamental right to a minimally adequate
Part V defines the scope of this right to include
education.
22. See Tamar Lewin, With Court Nod, Parents Debate School Drug Tests, N.Y. Times AI
(Sept. 29, 2002); see also Greg Giuffrida, Urine Tests Jar Tobacco Use, <http:/ /www.cbsncws.com/
stories/2002/10/08/national/main524640.shtml> (Oct. 8, 2002).
23. The Court did not dismiss the possibility "that some identitlable quantum of education is
a constitutionally protected prerequisite to the meaningful exercise of either Ithe right to speak or the
right to vote!." Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265,284 (1986) (quoting Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 36).
24. See infra Part IV.
25. Lawrence v. Texas, I 23 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
26. Id. at 2484 (holding that the liberty protected by the Constitution allows homosexual
persons the right to choose to enter into relationships in the contlnes of their homes and their own
private lives and still retain their dignity as free persons).
27. See e.g., Kristen Safier, The Question of a Fundamental Rigilt to a Minimally Adequate
Education, 69 U. Cin. L. Rev. 993 (2001); Thomas). Walsh, Education as a Fundamental Right Under
the United States Constitution, 29 Willamette L. Rev. 279 (1993).

393]

ACCESS TO EXTRACURRICULAR ACTIVITIES

397

extracurricular activities. Part VI concludes by urging the Supreme
Court to recognize a fundamental right to a minimally adequate
education in order to protect fully the educational opportunities of the
nation's schoolchildren.
II. EDUCATION AS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT

Public education is largely the province of state and local
governments. 2H While the U.S. Constitution does not explicitly mention
education, most state constitutions contain clauses concerning
education. 29 These education clauses point to the importance of
education and the role of the state government in providing education to
its citizens. 30 More than half of the forty-odd states that have addressed
the issue have concluded that their state constitutions guarantee a
fundamental right to education. 31 Interpretations, however, of the scope
of this right vary from state to state. 32
Unfortunately, state-based education rights do not adequately
safeguard the educational opportunities of the nation's schoolchildren.
While only a handful of states have interpreted the education clauses of
their constitutions to protect access to extracurricular activities to some
extent, 33 a large majority of state courts have rejected this notion. 34 The
limited reach of state constitutional rights to education has enabled
school districts to create barriers to accessing extracurricular activities.
In Earls, for example, a school district conditioned such access upon a
student's submission to drug testing. 35
The recognition that the U.S. Constitution guarantees a fundamental
right to a minimally adequate education that encompasses
extracurricular activities would provide students with the necessary

28. Victoria ). Dodd, Practical Education Law for the Twenty-First Century 21 (Carolina
Academic Press 2003).
29. Jd. at 121.
30. Jd.
31. Victoria). Dodd, A Critique of the Bush Education Proposal, 53 Admin. L. Rev. 851,866
(20()]) (citing e.g., Washakie County Sch. Dist. No. One v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo. 1980);
Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971), superceded, Crawford v. Huntington Beach Union High
Sch. Dist., 98 Cal. App. 4th 1275 (2002)).
32. See infra Part V.
33. See e.g., Grabow v. Montana High Sch. Assn., 59 P.3d 14, 17-18 (Mont. 2002) ("Students
clearly have the right to participate in extracurricular activities. That right to participate in
extracurricular activities is a right that is subject to constitutional protection.") (internal citations
omitted).
34. Dodd, supra n. 28, at 251.
35. Earls, 536 U.S. at 838.
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protection. 36 Indeed, if the Supreme Court recognizes such a right, the
educational opportunities of students will be protected regardless of the
state in which they attend school.

A. The Importance of Fundamental Rights
The Fourteenth Amendment, in part, prohibits states from depriving
"any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." 37
Courts utilize the Due Process Clause as a vehicle to engage in a
substantive review of state statutes that restrict individuals' freedom of
action. 3s
The level of scrutiny that a court applies in its evaluation of a law
depends on the nature of the right upon which the regulation infringes. 39
If a statute regulates economics or matters of social welfare, for example,
the courts will apply only a minimal level of scrutiny. 40 Under this
standard of judicial review, a statute is constitutional so long as it is
rationally related to a legitimate interest of the government. 41 Hence, a
court will uphold economic and social welfare laws unless it finds that
the legislature has "acted in an arbitrary and irrational way." 42
If, however, a law regulates the exercise of fundamental rights and
liberties that are explicitly or implicitly protected by the Constitution, the
courts will apply a test of strict judicial scrutiny. 43 A court applying this
heightened standard will give much less deference to the legislative
body. 44 To withstand the strict-scrutiny test, a law that abridges a
fundamental right will be found unconstitutional unless it has been
narrowly tailored by the legislature to serve a compelling state interest. 45

36. See infra Part V.
37. U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
38. john E. Nowak & Ronald D. Rotunda, Constitutional Law 382 (5th ed., West 1995).
39. In U.S. v. Carotene Prods. Co., justice Stone, in his famous Footnote Four, succinctly stated
that legislation is subject to a "more searching judicial inquiry" when it affects a fundamental right.
U.S. v. Carotene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-153 n. 4 (1938). Stone opined that "[t]hcre may be
narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its
face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendmen ls,
which are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth." ld. See also
Milton R. Konvitz, Fundamental Rights: History of a Constitutional Doctrine 148-52 (Rutgers 200 I).
40. Nowak, supra n. 38, at 383. See also Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., 34il U.S. 483, 48788 (1955); Fergus(m v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726,731-32 (1963).
41. Nowak, supra n. 38, at 383.
42. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 83 (1978) (quoting Usery v.
Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15 (1976).
43. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 17-19.
44. Nowak, supra n. 38, at 383-84.
45. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973); see also Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S.
621, 627 (1969); Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479, 485 ( 1965); Erwin Chernerinsky, Constitutional
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Under this two-tier approach, even if the court identifies a compelling
state interest for enacting a regulation, it will not uphold the statute
unless the state's objective cannot be achieved in a less burdensome
way.1(' Consequently, a court applying strict scrutiny is much more likely
to render a statute unconstitutional than a court applying a lesser level of
scrutiny.
The level of scrutiny that a court employs in evaluating the
constitutionality of a particular piece of legislation plays a vital role in the
determination of whether the law will be upheld or struck down. As
such, determining which rights are "fundamental," and thus trigger strict
scrutiny, is of immense importance. The Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause provides heightened protection against governmental
interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests that are
not specifically enumerated in the Constitution or its Amendments. 47
The Supreme Court has described fundamental rights as those rights that
are "'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition,' ... and
'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' such that 'neither liberty nor
justice would exist if they were sacrificed."' 48 The Court has determined
that the Due Process Clause gives fundamental-right status to the right to
marry, the right to have children, the right to direct the education and
upbringing of one's children, the right to enjoy marital privacy, the right
to use contraception, the right to maintain bodily integrity, and the right
to have an abortion. 49 While the Court has historically been reluctant to
recognize new fundamental rights imbedded in the Due Process Clause, 50

Law: Principles and Policies 529 (Aspen L. & Bus. 1997).

46. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 51; Dunn v. Blumenstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972). It should be
noted that the Rodriguez and Dunn cases involved equal protection, rather than substantive due
process analysis. Nonetheless, the courts should use the same standards of review regardless of
whether they are employing a substantive due process or equal protection review. Nowak, supra n.
38, at 383.
47. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,720 (1997); see also Nowak, supra n. 38, at 387. In
his famous dissenting opinion in Lochner v. N.Y., Justice Holmes suggested that certain rights
deserve heightened protection from legislative intrusion:
I think the word liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment is perverted when it is held to prevent

the Jutural outcome of a dominant opinion, unless it can be said that a rational and fair man
necessarily would admit that the statute proposed would infringe fundamental principles as
they have been understood by the tradition of our people and our law.
19R U.S. 45, 76 (I '!OS) (Holmes,)., dissenting); see also Konvitz, supra n. 39, at 15.
Indeed, a "fair and enlightened system of justice" would be impossible if the nation's citizens were
denied certain fundamental rights. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319,325 (1937), rev'd in part
on other grounds, Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 ( 1969).
48. Washington, 521 U.S. at 720-21 (quoting Moore v. City of E Clcvel.md, 431 U.S. 494, 503
(1977)); Palko, 302 U.S. at 325-26.
49.

Washington, 521 U.S. at 720 (internal citations omitted).

50. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194-95 (1986), overruled, Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct.
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its recent decision in Lawrence v. Texas suggests a new willingness by the
Court to recognize protections not explicitly written into the text of the
Constitution. 5 1

B. Education as a Fundamental Right under the U.S. Constitution
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that "education provides the
basic tools by which individuals might lead economically productive lives
to the benefit of us all." 52 Indeed, an adequate public education is
necessary to prepare our nation's citizens to "exercise the role of selfgovernment," and to produce the well-trained and educated workforce
upon which our economic system relies. 53
In Brown v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court found that racial
segregation in public schools deprives schoolchildren of equal
educational opportunities in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. 54 Chief Justice Warren's majority decision
stressed the significance of education to the nation's children and society
as a whole:
[E]ducation is perhaps the most important function of state and local
governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great
expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the
importance of education to our democratic society. It is required in the
performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in
the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today
it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in
preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to
adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that
any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied
the opportunity of an education. 55
This view of education is consistent with that of prior and
subsequent Supreme Court decisions.
For example, in Meyer v.
Nebraska, 56 the Court noted that "[t]he American people have always
regarded education and [the] acquisition of knowledge as matters of
supreme importance .... " 57 Furthermore, the Court's decision in
2472 (2003); Washington, 521 U.S. at 720.
51. See infra Part lll(B).
52. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,221 (1982).

53. Elizabeth Reilly, Education and the Constitution: Shaping Each Other and the Next
Century, 34 Akron L. Rev. I, 1-2 (2000).
54. Brown v. Rd. ofl.!duc. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483,493-95 (1954).
55. Id. at 493.
56. Meyer v. Neb., 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923) (invalidating a state law that prohibited the
teaching of foreign languages to young children).
57. ld.
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Wisconsin v. YodersH pointed out that "some degree of education is
necessary to reasonably prepare citizens to participate effectively and
intelligently in our political system if we are to preserve freedom and
independence." 5 Y
Despite the Court's stated high regard for education, it has repeatedly
refused to elevate education to the status of a fundamental right. In San
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, the Supreme Court
specifically held that there is no fundamental right to education. 611 The
Court found that Constitution does not explicitly or implicitly provide
for such a right. 61 The 5-4 decision upheld Texas' unequal school
financing system, which provided more funding to schools in districts
with higher property taxes. 62 Because the Court declined to recognize
education as a fundamental right, the Texas law was subjected to, and
survived, only a minimal level of judicial scrutiny. 63 The Court rejected
the argument that education is essential to the effective exercise of other
constitutional rights, such as the right to free speech and the right to
vote. 64 The Rodriguez decision evinces the Court's fear that the
recognition of a fundamental right to education would create a slippery
slope where more and more unenumerated rights would have to be
acknowledged. 65 Certainly, such a decision would raise the possibility of
the Court having to recognize fundamental rights to other necessities,
such as housing, food, or employment. 66
In Plyler v. Doe, the Supreme Court reiterated its position that
education is not entitled to fundamental-right status. 67 However, Justice
Brennan's majority opinion noted that education is not "merely some
governmental 'benefit' indistinguishable from other forms of social
welfare legislation." 6H The Plyler Court went on to strike down a Texas
statute that denied a free public education to the children of illegal
SH. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972) (exempting Amish students, on religious
freedom grounds, from a state requirement to attend school until the age of sixteen).
59. !d.

60. 411 U.S. at 35.
61.

!d.

62.

/d.at11-12.

63. Sec Safier, supra n. 27, at 1003 (noting that "the undisputed importance of education will
not alone cause this Court to depart from the usual standard for reviewing a State's social and
economic legislation." Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 35).
64.

!d. at 35-37.

See id. at 37.
66. See id. ("How ... is education to be distinguished from the significant personal interests in
the basics of decent food and shelter?"). See also james E. Ryan, The Supreme Court and Public
Schools, H6 Va. L. Rev. 1335, 1392 (2000).
65.

67. 457 U.S. at 221.
oK

hi.
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aliens. 69 In reaching its decision, the majority relied on "the innocent
nature of the children," whose parents brought them into this country,
and on the importance of education. 70 The Court did not employ strict
scrutiny, but it used a heightened level of judicial review to analyze the
Texas statute. 71 Under this "intermediate" level of review, the law was
declared unconstitutional because it denied certain children of a basic
education without furthering a "substantial state interest." 72 Even so, the
enhanced scrutiny utilized by the Court in Plyler was dependent upon the
specific facts of that case/3 and the Court has declined to extend its
rationale to other cases?4
The Court's repeated failure to recognize a fundamental right to
education has paved the way for decisions, such as Vernonia and Earls,
which enable states to enact legislation that significantly infringes on
schoolchildren's educational opportunities. While Plyler acknowledges
that education is more than a mere governmental benefit/ 5 the decision
does little to safeguard the education of children who do not find
themselves in the unique position of the children in that case. Until some
minimum level of education is formally granted constitutional
protection, students will be left without a sufficient judicial mechanism
to challenge laws that ultimately restrict them from achieving their full
educational potential.
III.

Two RAYS OF HOPE

While the Supreme Court's jurisprudence regarding education has
had the effect of depriving some students of important educational
opportunities, there is room to remedy the situation. First, the Court has
never conclusively determined whether there is some minimal degree of
education that is indeed fundamentaF 6 Second, the decision in Lawrence
may demonstrate the Court's new approach to fundamental rights
analysis, which increases the probability that additional fundamental

69. I d. at 230.
70. See Ryan, supra n. 66, at 1393.
71. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 223-24.
72. Id. at 230.
73. The alien children that were harmed in Plyler were brought to the United States by their
parents. The Texas statute penalized them for the actions of their parents. See id. at 220.
74. See Ryan, supra n. 66, at 1394-95. The Supreme Court has not extended Plyler "beyond
the 'unique circumstances' that provoked its 'unique confluence of theories and rationales."'
Kadrmas v. Dickson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450, 459 (1988).
75. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221.
76. See infra Part III(A).
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rights, such as a right to education, will be acknowledged. 77
A. The Door Left Open

The Rodriguez and Plyler decisions declared that education is not a
fundamental right. 78 However, in Plyler, the Supreme Court found that a
complete denial of access to education is unconstitutionaJ.7 9 Therefore,
the issue of whether the Constitution protects some minimal degree of
education remains open today. Indeed, in Papasan v. Allain, the Court
noted that Rodriguez and Plyler indicate that it "has not yet definitively
settled the questions whether a minimally adequate education is a
fundamental right and whether a statute alleged to ... infringe that right
should be accorded heightened ... review." 80
In Rodriguez, the Court upheld a Texas school financing system and
declared that education is not a fundamental right. 81 However, Justice
Powell's majority opinion twice implied that there might be a
fundamental right to a minimally adequate education. First, the decision
observed that Texas provided "an adequate base education for all
children" and suggested that the statute might be deemed
unconstitutional if some children were excluded from access to school
altogether. 82 Second, the Court noted that there was no meaningful
disparity in school funding between Texas' different districts, and hinted
that the statute might be struck down if such a disparity existed. 83 Justice
Powell opined that " [e ]ven if it were conceded that some identifiable
quantum of education is a constitutionally protected prerequisite to the
meaningful exercise of [the right to speak or the right to vote], we have
no indication that the present levels of educational expenditures in Texas
provide an education that falls short."M Furthermore, the majority
explained that there is
no basis for finding an interference with fundamental rights where only
relative differences in spending levels are involved and where ... no
charge fairly could be made that the system fails to provide each child

77. See infra Part III(B).
78. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 223; Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 35.
79. See Ryan, supra n. 66, at 1393.
80. Papasan, 478 U.S. at 285. See also Kadrmas, 487 U.S. at 467 n. I (Marshall, J., dissenting)
("In prior cases this Court explicitly has left open the question whether a deprivation of access [to a
minimally adequate education] would violate a fundamental constitutional right. That question
remains open today.") (internal citations omitted).
81. Rodriguez,4ll U.S.atll-12,35.

82. I d. at 25 n. 60; see Ryan, supra n. 66, at 1392.
83. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 36-37.
84. Jd.
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with an opportunity to acquire the basic minimal skills necessary for
the enjoyment of the rights of speech and of full participation in the
political process. xs
Based on this reasoning, the Court might be willing to recognize a
fundamental right to a minimally adequate education if it were
confronted with a case where some children were deprived of the
opportunity to acquire a basic education.
In Plyler, the Supreme Court struck down, on equal protection
grounds, a Texas statute that denied a free public education to children of
illegal aliens. 86 At first glance it would appear that the Plyler Court had
the opportunity to recognize a fundamental right to an adequate
education and declined to do so. Indeed, the Court confronted a statute
that completely denied some children access to a basic education.
Instead of recognizing a fundamental right, however, the Court applied
an intermediate level of scrutiny. 87
It is important to remember, however, that the children affected by
the Texas statute were undocumented aliens in violation of federallaw,Kx
and that such status is not a constitutional irrelevancy.x9 For example,
undocumented aliens cannot be treated as a suspect class for the purpose
of triggering strict scrutiny in an equal protection analysis. 90 Similarly,
the Court may not have been comfortable recognizing a new
fundamental right in a case that dealt with the opportunities of those who
were in this country illegally. Nonetheless, the idea of a complete denial
of education to certain children, whose illegal status was brought about
by their parents, did not sit well with the Court. 91
Since undocumented aliens are not considered a suspect class, the
Court relied on the importance of education in order to employ a
heightened standard of judicial review. 92 The majority opinion noted
that education is more than a mere governmental benefit, and that it "has
a fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of our society." 93 The Court
further stated that "[b ]y denying ... children a basic education, we deny
them the ability to live within the structure of our civic institutions, and
foreclose any realistic possibility that they will contribute in even the

85.

Id. at 37.

86. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 230.
87. I d. at 218 n. 16,223-24.
88. !d. at 205.
90.

Id. at 223.
Jd.

91.

See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 223-24.

92.

Jd.

89.

93. Id. at 221.
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smallest way to the progress of our Nation." 94 Notably, this reasoning
highlights the significance of education to society, and demonstrates the
Court's willingness to elevate its judicial scrutiny of laws that seriously
infringe upon a child's educational opportunities, even without formal
recognition of a fundamental right. 95
In sum, the reasoning in Rodriguez and Plyler, as acknowledged in
Papasan, indicates that the Supreme Court has not foreclosed the
possibility of recognizing a fundamental right to a minimally adequate
education.
B. A Roadblock Removed

When the Supreme Court issued its decision in Bowers v. Hardwick,
it placed a barrier on the path to the future recognition of new
fundamental rights through the Due Process Clause. In that case, the
Court held that the Constitution does not confer a fundamental right
upon homosexuals to engage in consensual sodomy. 96 According to the
majority, proscriptions against sodomy have ancient roots that pre-date
the birth of the United States. 97 Furthermore, until 1961, all fifty States
outlawed the practice. 98 Hence, the Court stated, a homosexual's right to
engage in sodomy cannot be considered '"deeply rooted in this Nation's
history and tradition' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."' 99
Most importantly, the Bowers Court declared that it was not
"inclined to take a more expansive view of [its] authority to discover new
fundamental rights imbedded in the Due Process Clause." 100 Justice
White's majority opinion states:
The Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it
deals with judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable
roots in the language or design of the Constitution . . . . There should
be, therefore, great resistance to expand the substantive reach of [the
Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments],
particularly if it requires redefining the category of rights deemed to be
fundamental. Otherwise, the Judiciary necessarily takes to itself further
authority to govern the country without constitutional authority. 101

94.

/d. at 223.

95. See id. at 223-24.
96. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192.
97. I d. at 192. The majority noted that sodomy was considered a criminal offense by the laws
of the original thirteen States when they ratified the Bill of Rights. Jd.
98.

/d. at 193.

'19. !d. at 194.
100.

/d.

10 I.

/d. at 194-'15.
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While Bowers clearly demonstrated the Supreme Court's
unwillingness to recognize new fundamental rights, there is some
question as to whether the decision would have actually prevented the
Court from recognizing a fundamental right to a minimally adequate
education. The Court decided Bowers on June 30, 1986. 102 One day later,
the Court decided Papasan v. Allain. 103 That opinion, which was also
written by Justice White, clearly stated that the Court had yet to
determine whether there is a fundamental right to a minimally adequate
education. 104 Therefore, one could argue that Bowers was not intended to
bar the possible future recognition of a fundamental right to a minimally
adequate education. Considering that both opinions were written by
Justice White within such a short period of time, if such a restriction
were to be imposed Justice White would likely have mentioned it in

Papasan.
In Lawrence v. Texas, the Supreme Court removed any possible
barrier that Bowers might have presented to the recognition of a
fundamental right to a minimally adequate education by explicitly
overruling Bowers. 105 Lawrence involved an almost identical set of facts
as Bowers. Police officers were dispatched to a private home in response
to a reported weapons disturbance. 106
They entered Lawrence's
apartment and observed him engaging in a sexual act with another
man. 107 The two men were arrested and eventually convicted for
violating a Texas statute that prohibited "deviate sexual intercourse with
a member of the same sex." 108 The Texas Court of Appeals rejected the
defendants' constitutional arguments under the Equal Protection and
Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, 109 and relied on
Bowers to uphold the convictions. 110 The Supreme Court seized the
opportunity to readdress Bowers and granted certiorari. 111
The Lawrence majority expanded the scope of the Due Process
Clause to include a homosexual's right to engage in private, consensual

102. /d. at 186.
103. Papasan, 478 U.S. at 265.
I 04.

Id. at 285.

105. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2484 ("Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and it is not
correct today. It ought not to remain binding precedent. Bowers v. Hardwick should be and now is
overruled.").
106. Id. at 2475.
107. Id. at 2476-77.
108. Id. at 2476.
109. Id.
110. !d.
Ill. I d.
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homosexual activity without the intervention of the government. 112 In
reaching this conclusion, the opinion rejected the assumptions on which
the Bowers decision rested. The Bowers Court pointed to historical
proscriptions against sodomy to find that sexual conduct between
members of the same sex is not a right that is "deeply rooted in this
Nation's history and tradition," and, therefore, is not fundamental.m To
the contrary, the Lawrence Court stated that there is no longstanding
history in this country of laws directed against homosexual conduct as a
distinct matter. 114 According to the majority, state laws targeting samesex couples do not possess "ancient roots." 115 In reality, no state singled
out same-sex relations for criminal prosecution until the 1970s, and only
nine states have ever done so. 116 Furthermore, the majority criticized the
Bowers Court's reliance on the historical Judea-Christian condemnation
of homosexual practices. 117
Significantly, Lawrence notes that "our laws and traditions in the past
half century are of most relevance" in determining whether a right is
fundamental. 11 H Accordingly, in the view of the Court, an examination of
legislation and public attitudes during the most relevant time period
reveals "an emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial protection
to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters
pertaining to sex." 119 The Court's new willingness to look more
searchingly into the nation's recent past, as opposed to clinging to ideals
that were predominant when the Constitution was drafted, suggests that
additional fundamental rights might be recognized as the attitudes of the
nation evolve over time. Indeed, it now appears that the Court may
acknowledge fundamental rights that are "deeply rooted" in the United
States' history and tradition of the past half century.
The significance of the Lawrence decision stretches far beyond the
new protections given to homosexuals. The decision reveals the Supreme
Court's new approach to fundamental rights analysis. In dissent, Justice
Scalia correctly noted that the Court did not declare that homosexual
sodomy is a fundamental right. 1211 Hence, strict scrutiny was not
112. Id. at 2484.
113. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192-94.
114. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2478. Early American sodomy laws were not directed at
homosexuals, but instead sought to prohibit non procreative sexual activity regardless of the gender
of those involved. !d. at 2479.
115. !d. at 2479.
116. Id.
117. I d. at 2480.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. !d. at 2488 (Scalia, )., dissenting).
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triggered. The Court instead applied a rational-basis test to strike down
the Texas sodomy statute. 121 Notwithstanding, the majority opinion
represents a shift away from the slippery-slope concerns that were
evident in Bowers and Rodriguez. 122 According to the Lawrence majority:
Had those who drew and ratified the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth
Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment known the components of
liberty in its manifold possibilities, they might have been more specific.
They did not presume to have this insight . . . . As the Constitution
endures, persons in every generation can invoke its principles in their
own search for greater freedom. 123

As such, the Lawrence Court announced its current prerogative to
interpret the Constitution and the Due Process Clauses more broadly in
order to protect the liberties of the nation's citizens. A majority of the
Court has now rejected the philosophy of Bowers, 124 which preached
resistance to expanding the body of rights deemed to be fundamental. 125
The Lawrence decision demonstrates that the Supreme Court is open
to the possibility of recognizing new fundamental rights when they are
"deeply rooted" in the history and tradition of the past half century. The
Court's attitude has clearly changed since it addressed the question of a
fundamental right to education in Rodriguez and Plyler. Therefore,
should the Court again be faced with the issue, it is now more likely that
it will find that the right exists to some extent.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS FOR THE RECOGNITION OF THIS
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT

The Fourteenth Amendment, in part, prohibits the states from
depriving "any person oflife, liberty, or property, without due process of
law." 126 Any examination of "fundamental rights under the Due Process
Clause of the U.S. Constitution involves interpreting the word
'liberty."' 127 Given the broader view of "liberty" expounded by the
Supreme Court in Lawrence v. Texas, 128 there are two likely bases upon

121. Id. at 2484.
122. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 37 (expressing concern that if a fundamental right to education
were recognized, the Court may be compelled to recognize other significant personal interests, such
as rights to decent food and shelter).
123. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2484 (emphasis omitted).
124. Id.
125. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 194-95.
126. U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
127. Walsh, supra n. 27, at 285.
128. See supra Part lll(B).
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which the Court could find a fundamental right to a minimally adequate
education. First, the Court could determine that this fundamental right
is implicit in the other rights that are expressly protected by the
Constitution or the Bill of Rights. 129 Second, the Court could find that a
right to a minimally adequate education is "deeply rooted in this Nation's
history and tradition" such that "neither liberty nor justice would exist" if
the right was not recognized. 130
A. Penumbras and Emanations

In Griswold v. Connecticut, the Supreme Court held that privacy is a
fundamental right. 131 Like the right to education, the right to privacy is
not specified in the text of the Constitution. However, according Justice
Douglas's majority opinion, "[s]pecific guarantees in the Bill of Rights
have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help
give them life and substance." 132 The Griswold opinion declared that the
explicitly protected rights of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth
Amendments implicitly formed the fundamental right of privacy. 133
Indeed, the Court found that "[t]he right of privacy is an 'emanation'
from the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights, which are incorporated
into the 'liberty' of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment." 134
The Rodriguez Court declined to apply Griswold's reasoning to
education, despite the argument that education is essential to the
effective exercise of other constitutional rights, such as the right to free
speech and the right to vote. 135 However, the theory that the right to
education is implicit in other enumerated rights deserves further
consideration. Rodriguez was a 5-4 decision that contained several
strong dissenting opinions. 136 As such, the Court's determination
regarding the right to education, in the words of one scholar, "is not an
impregnable fortress incapable of being successfully attacked." 137
Moreover, shifts in the Supreme Court's makeup and its attitude toward

129. See infra Part IV(A).

130. See injr·a Part IV(B). See also Washington, 52! U.S. at 720-21 (quoting Moore, 43! U.S. at
494).
131. 3Hl U.S. at 4H4-85.
132.
133.

!d. at 484.
!d. at 481-85. Sec also Walsh, supra n. 27, at 286.

134. Konvitz, supra n. 39, at 114; see Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484.
135. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 35-37.
136. Timothy D. Lynch, Education as a Fundamental Right: Challenging the Supreme Court's
Jurisprudence, 26 Hof,tra L. Rev. 953, 992 (1998).
137. Id.
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fundamental rights analysis could lead it to reverse Rodriguez. 13 x
The Lawrence decision evinces such a shift. With Lawrence the
Court eliminated the slippery slope concerns that highlighted the
Rodriguez Court's rejection of the Griswold-like argument that the right
to education stems from other enumerated rights. 139 Hence, if the Court
were presented with question of a fundamental right to a minimally
adequate education today, the Court might be more likely to agree with
Justice Marshall's dissent in Rodriguez. In Rodriguez, Marshall reasoned
that "[a]s the nexus between the specific constitutional guarantee and the
nonconstitutional interest draws closer, the nonconstitutional interest
becomes more fundamental and the degree of judicial scrutiny applied
when the interest is infringed ... must be adjusted accordingly." 140
Several specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights require some amount
of education before they can be effectively exercised. 141 Hence, the Court
may rely on Griswold's "penumbras" doctrine to find a fundamental right
to a minimally adequate education. Certainly, one could argue that some
degree of education is a necessary prerequisite to the exercise of the right
to speak and the right to vote. 142 The right to speak may be considered
meaningless unless the speaker is able to articulate his or her thoughts
intelligently and persuasively. 143 Similarly, citizens cannot effectively
utilize their right to vote if they do not possess some level of reading and
reasoning skills. 144 In addition, the Fourth Amendment protects against
unreasonable searches and seizures by requiring a warrant describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 145 Some
degree of education is necessary for a citizen to determine whether a
warrant is valid. 146 Likewise, some quantity of education is required to
exercise the First Amendment right to "petition the Government for a
redress of grievances." 147
In sum, Griswold provides a basis for the recognition of a
fundamental right to a minimally adequate education. Although the

138. See id.
139. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 37.
140. Id. at 102-03 (Marshall,)., dissenting).
141. See Walsh, supra n. 27, at 286.
142. These arguments were rejected in Rodriguez. 411 U.S. at 35. However, as discussed, the
Court might now take a different stance in the wake of the Lawrence decision.
143. Id. at 35.
144. Id. at 35-36. The Court has noted that "some degree of education is necessary to prepare
citizens to participate effectively and intelligently in our open political system if we are to preserve
freedom and independence." Yoder, 406 U.S. at 221.
145. U.S. Const. amend. IV.
146. Walsh, supra n. 27, at 286.
147. U.S. Const. amend. I. See Walsh, supra n. 27, at 286.
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Rodriguez Court rejected the argument that certain enumerated rights
form a fundamental right to education, the attitude of the current Court,
as evidenced by its decision in Lawrence, suggests that it might, if asked,
find that some amount of education is indeed deserving of fundamental
rights protection in order to safeguard the exercise of specifically
guaranteed rights.
B. Education is Deeply Rooted in The Nation's History and Tradition

The Court may also find a fundamental right to a minimally
adequate education using a historical approach. Fundamental rights are
those rights that are '"deeply rooted in this Nation's history and
tradition,' and 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,' such that
'neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed."' 148 A brief
look at the nation's early history evinces the central role of education in
the traditions of American society. 149
For example, some early
seventeenth century colonies required local governments to establish
schools that taught reading and writing. 150 By the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries, many colonial and state constitutions contained
language guaranteeing a right to education for all children within a
state. 151 Shortly after Massachusetts established the first compulsory
education system in 1837, most states followed Massachusetts' lead and
created similar systems. 152
Although evidence of the important role of education dates to preindependence colonial times, the Supreme Court might still find that
public education was not "deeply rooted" in our history and tradition
when the Constitution was ratified. Despite the early origins of public
education in America, 153 the public was largely unreceptive to
involvement in education when the Constitution was signed. 154 Even as
recently as 1910, only 6 percent of the nation's population had completed
high school. 155 Hence, the Founders' silence regarding education,
coupled with limited participation in available schooling, might indicate
that the Founders did not consider education to be a guaranteed right of

148.

Washington, 52! U.S. at 720-21 (internal citations omitted).

149. See Dodd, supra n. 31, at 863.
150. See id. (citing Jenkins v. Andover, !03 Mass. 94, 97 (1869) (explaining history and public
utility of public schools)).
151. Dodd, supra n. 28, at 9.
152. Id.
153. See Dodd, supra n. 31, at 863.
154. See Walsh, supra n. 27, at 288.
155. Dodd, supra n. 28, at 9.
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the people. 156 According to this line of reasoning, education, therefore,
cannot be considered to be so "deeply rooted" as to be deemed
fundamental. 157
Nonetheless, the Lawrence majority's view of fundamental rights
analysis indicates that the Court would be more likely to find education
to be "deeply rooted," and thus fundamental, if and when it addresses the
issue again. As shown above, Lawrence indicates that the Court now
believes that the nation's "laws and traditions in the past half century are
of most relevance" in determining whether a fundamental right exists. 158
It is clear that education has played a fundamental role in the lives of
Americans over the past fifty years. In 1954, the Brown Court declared
the importance of education to a democratic society, 159 writing: "[I]t is
doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if
he is denied the opportunity of an education." 160 In Plyler, the Court
labeled education as playing "a fundamental role in maintaining the
fabric of our society."'"' Even the Rodriguez decision noted the
significance of education to society and the Court's "historic dedication
to education." 162 Additionally, in considering whether there is a
fundamental right to education under their state constitutions, more
than half of the forty-plus states that have addressed the issue have
declared that such a right exists. 163 Hence, it is foreseeable that at some
point in the future, a majority of states will have recognized a
fundamental right to education under state law. 164 Such a development
would demonstrate the important place of education in the United States
and might influence the Supreme Court to recognize a federal
fundamental right to education. 165
Most illuminating, however, is current statistical research showing
that 87 percent of the nation's children obtained a high school degree in
2000. 166 Notably, approximately 91 percent of eighth-grade children in

156. Walsh, supra n. 27, at 288.
157. Id. ("[O]ur early historical experience contravenes the notion of education as a
fundamental right.").
158. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2480.
159. 347 U.S. at 493.
160. Id.
161. 457 U.S. at 221.
162. 411 U.S. at 30.
163. Dodd, supra n. 31, at 866.
164. Id.
165. Id.

166. U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, Trends in the Well-Being of America's Children
& Youth 2002 325 <http://aspe.os.dhhs.gov/hsp/02trends/EAl.pdf> (accessed jan. 22, 2004).
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the United States attend a public, rather than a private, school. 167 As
such, the dependence of schoolchildren on public education clearly
demonstrates that the system of public education is now "deeply rooted"
in this nation's traditions and history and should be recognized as
fundamental. 16R
V. EXTRACURRICULAR ACTIVITIES ARE PART Of A MINIMALLY ADEQUATE
EDUCATION

The Supreme Court's decisions in Vernonia and Earls enable school
districts to enact policies that interfere with schoolchildren's access to
extracurricular activities. 169 Such policies can have the result of depriving
certain students of important educational opportunities. 170 Therefore,
the scope of a fundamental right to a minimally adequate education
should be broad enough to encompass extracurricular activities. 171 The
recognition of such a right would afford students protection from the
types of policies that were upheld in Vernonia and Earls. 172

A. Defining the Right
Although the Supreme Court has left open the possible recognition
of a fundamental right to a minimally adequate education, 173 it has said
little to define the possible bounds of such a right. 174 It is clear, however,
that extracurricular activities have a significant presence in the lives of
schoolchildren across our nation. Approximately 99.8 percent of our
nation's high schools provide some type of extracurricular activity. 175
These offerings include participation in various school publications,
performing arts, athletics, honor societies, student government, academic
clubs, vocational clubs, service clubs, and hobby clubs. 176 About 80

167. Dodd, supra n. 28, at 10.
16H. See Walsh, supra n. 27, at 292 ("[T]he value of public education in the minds of the
American people has developed beyond what it was at the adoption of the Constitution. That value
has now become so much a part of our historical experience that it should be considered a
fundamental right.").
169. See supra Part I.
170. See id.
171. See infra Part V(A).
172.

See infra Part V(B).

173. See supra Part Ill(A).
174. Saficr, supra n. 27, at 1009. Note, however, that the Court has indicated that "allegations
of a funding disparity alone would not be sufficient to show educational inadequacy." Id. (citing
Papasan, 478 U.S. at 266).
175. Extracurricular Participation, supra n. 3.
176. !d.
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percent of high school seniors participate in at least one of these
activities. 177 According to the National Federation of High School
Associations, "[s]tudents participating in a number of [extracurricular]
activities not only achieve better academically but also express greater
satisfaction with the total high school experience than students who do
not participate." 178 Indeed, "eliminating the opportunity for such
participation eliminates the last link to fostering a sense of belonging to
school that some students have." 179 Hence, extracurricular activities
should be encompassed within the fundamental right to a minimally
adequate education if, and when, the Court recognizes this right.
State court decisions that consider educational adequacy may shed
light upon the possible scope of a fundamental right to a minimally
adequate education. 180 Unlike the U. S. Constitution, most state
constitutions contain a clause pertaining to education. 181
These
education clauses vary in language from state to state. 182 One of the most
influential state court cases dealing with the interpretation of an
education clause was decided by the Supreme Court of Kentucky in Rose
v. Council for Better Education. 183 Regardless of the exact language of the
state education clause in question, most state court adequacy decisions
have taken the Rose interpretation into consideration when making their
decisions. 184 The Rose Court defined the right to an adequate education
as follows:
[A]n efficient system of education must have as its goal to provide each
and every child with at least the seven following capacities: (i) sufficient
oral and written communication skills to enable students to function in
a complex and rapidly changing civilization; (ii) sufficient knowledge of
economic, social, and political systems to enable the student to make
177. Id.
178. The Case for High School Activities, supra n. 6.
179. john H. Holloway, Extracurricular Activities: The Path to Academic Suaess?, 57 Educ.
Leadership 87, 88 (Dec. 1999) (citing Susan Gerber, Extracurricular Activities and Academic
Achievement, 30 ). Research & Dev. in Educ. 42,50 (Fall 1996)).
180. Safier, supra n. 27, at 1009.
181. Dodd, supra n. 28, at 121.
182. Erin E. Buzuvis, "A" for Effort: Evaluating Recent State Education Reform in Response to
judicial Demands for Equity and Adequacy, 86 Cornell L. Rev. 644, 654 (2001 ). More than half of the
state education clauses mandate a threshold level of educational quality. Some clauses specifically
identify subjects upon which the state's education system should focus. Other state constitutions
contain clauses emphasizing the purpose and importance of education. Finally, some constitutions
include specific provisions for nondiscrimination, accessibility, and uniformity. I d.
183. Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989).
184. Buzuvis, supra n. 182, at 655; see also Kelly Thompson Cochran, Beyond School Financing:
Defining the Constitutional Right to an Adequate Education, 78 N.C. L. Rev. 399, 413 (2000) (labeling
the Rose interpretation of a minimally adequate education as "a prototype for other state courts
around the country").
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informed choices; (iii) sufficient understanding of governmental
processes to enable the student to understand the issues that affect his
or her community, state, and nation; (iv) sufficient self-knowledge and
knowledge of his or her mental and physical wellness; (v) sufficient
grounding in the arts to enable each student to appreciate his or her
cultural and historical heritage; (vi) sufficient training or preparation
for advanced training in either academic or vocational fields so as to
enable each child to choose and pursue work intelligently; and (vii)
sufficient levels of academic or vocational skills to enable public school
students to compete favorably with their counterparts in surrounding
states, in academics or in the job market. 185
The Rose decision outlined the goals of an adequate system of
education. While most state courts that have addressed the issue have
concluded that a state-based fundamental right to education does not
encompass extracurricular activities, 186 it appears that those opportunities
should fall within the protection of the minimal adequacy level defined in
Rose. "Extracurricular activities provide a channel for reinforcing the
lessons learned in the classroom, applying academic skills in a real-world
context, and thus may be considered part of a well-rounded
education." 187
For example, extracurricular activities foster the
communication skills that enable students to function in our society by
placing them in situations that enhance their social skills. 188
The Rose court declared that an adequate education should also
prepare schoolchildren for advanced educational training and
competition in the job market. 189 Indeed, extracurricular involvement is
integral to those who wish to continue their academic training. A
student's participation and success in extracurricular activities is an
important factor in the admission process for most colleges and
universities. 19° Furthermore, certain extracurricular activities, such as
185. Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 212.
186. Dodd, supra n. 28, at 251.
187. Extracurricular Participation, supra n. 3.
188. Exec. Procl. 5109, supra n. I; The Case for High School Activities, supra n. 6; Holloway,
supra n. !79.
189. 790 S.W.2d at 212; see also Trinidad, 963 P.2d at !109 (noting that "the reality for many
studcnb who wish to pursue post-secondary educational training and/or professional vocations
requiring experience garnered only by participating in extracurricular activities is that they must
engage in such activities").
190. See e.g. Harvard College Admissions, FAQS, <http://www.admissions.college.harvard.edu/
faqs/adnmsions/ app_polsi> (accessed jan. 13, 2004) (stating that "leadership and distinction in
extracurricular activities" are part of Harvard's admissions criteria); N.Y. U. Admissions,
<http://admissions.nyu.edu/before/index.php> (accessed jan. 13, 2004) (stating that the New York
University Admissions Committee considers extracurricular activitie,; when reviewing application
for admission); U.C.L.A. Undergraduate Admissions and Relations with Schools, Freshman Admission
Process <http://www.admissions.ucla. edu/Prospect/Adm_frifradms.htrn> (accessed jan. 14, ?004)
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Future Farmers of America, teach students vocational skills that they can
use to enter the workforce directly after high school. 191 In sum,
extracurricular activities provide students with several of the educational
opportunities that the Rose Court sought to protect, and thus should be
included within this definition of a minimally adequate education.
vVhile many state courts have used Rose as a guide to define the scope
of an adequate education, some have taken a more conservative
19
approach. 1 ~ 2 For example, in Abbeyville County School District v. State, '
the Supreme Court of South Carolina propounded a narrower definition
of a minimally adequate education. 194 According to the Abbeyville court,
an adequate education system provides students "with adequate and safe
facilities and the opportunity to learn to read, write, and speak English, to
acquire knowledge of mathematics, physical science, economic, social
and political systems, history, governmental processes, and academic and
vocational skills." 195 Extracurricular activities would also fall within this
more limited definition of a minimally adequate education because they
teach academic and vocational skills that cannot be taught in the
classroom. 196
Upon recognition of a fundamental right to a minimally adequate
education, the federal judiciary will have to define its scope.IY7 Rose and
other state court cases, such as Abbeyville, can serve as a preliminary
guide for the federal courts as to the goals the fundamental right should
protect. 198 In addition, the Supreme Court has already demonstrated its
view on the role of education. According to the Court, public schools are
"the primary vehicle for transmitting 'the values on which our society
rests."' 199 Furthermore, "some degree of education is necessary to

(stating that U.C.L.A. considers "exceptional achievement" in extracurricular activities when
determining admissions); Binghamton U. Freshmen Information <http://admissions.binghamton.edu
/freshmen.html> (accessed jan. 25, 2004) ("[SUJ\Y Binghamton's] Undergraduate Admissions
Committee evaluates each application for both academic and non-academic strengths.
[W]e
look closely at a student's extracurricular activities and community involvement, leadership abilities,
intellectual curiosity, and the qualities that make each student unique.").
191. National FFA Organization, Mission Statement <http://www.ffa.org/media/news/
alger/downloads/ppt/student_parent-mac.ppt#2> (accessed jan. 14, 2004) ("[l'utun: brmers of
America] makes a positive difference in the lives of students by developing their potential t(>r
premier leadership, personal growth and career success through agricultural education.").
192. Safier, supra n, 27, at 1014.
193. Abbeyville County Sch. Dist. v. State, 515 S.E.2d 535 (S.C. 1999).
194. See Safier, supra n. 27, at 1014; Abbeyville, 515 S.E.2d at 540.
195. Saller, supra n. 27, at 1014. (citing Abbeyville, 515 S.E.2d at 540).
196. See supra n. IR4; Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 212; Exec. Prod. 5109, supra n. I.
197. Safier, supra n. 27, at 1019.
198. !d.
199. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221 (citing Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68,76 (1979)).
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prepare citizens to participate effectively and intelligently in our open
political system .... "200 The Court has also noted that "education
provides the basic tools by which individuals may lead economically
productive lives .... "201 As such, the definition of a fundamental right to
a minimally adequate education should provide schoolchildren with the
assurance that they will receive a level of training necessary to achieve the
goals of education previously expounded by the Supreme Court.
Further, extracurricular activities, which provide students with a
myriad of benefits202 and are inherently educational, 203 should be
encompassed within the right. Such activities are crucial, both to
students who enter the workforce directly after high school and to those
who move on to college. Indeed, these activities teach social and
vocational skills that are crucial to future economic success and
enjoyment in life. 204
Finally, it should be noted that there appears to be support on the
bench to include extracurricular activities within the definition of a
fundamental right to a minimally adequate education. Justice Ginsburg
stated in her Earls dissent that "[p] articipation in [extracurricular
activities] is a key component of school life, essential in reality for
students applying to college, and, for all participants, a significant
contributor to the breadth and quality of the educational experience." 205
As such, the fundamental right to a minimally adequate education, when
and if adopted by the Court, should include within its scope the
opportunity to participate in extracurricular activities.
B. Greater Protection for the Nation's Schoolchildren

The recognition of a fundamental right to a minimally adequate
education that encompasses extracurricular activities will protect
schoolchildren from the type of state policies that were upheld by the
Supreme Court in Vernonia and Earls. Indeed, a school district would
not be able to implement a drug-testing regime that has the ultimate
effect of depriving students of the opportunity to participate in
extracurricular activities. If a district enacted such a policy, a student
would be able to bring a substantive due process challenge in federal

200.

Yoder, 406 U.S. at 221.

201. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221.
202. See supra Part I.
203. The Case for High School Activities, supra n. 6.
204. Exec. Prod. 5109, supra n. 1.
205. Earls, 53fi U.S. at 845 (Ginsburg,)., dissenting); see also Harvard College Admissions, supra
n. 190; N.Y. U. Admissions, supra n. 190; U.C.L.A. Undergraduate Admissions and Relations with
Schools, supra n. 190; Binghamton U. Freshmen Information, supra n. 190.
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court to strike down the regulation.
If a state regulation interferes with a fundamental right, the courts
must apply "strict scrutiny" to determine the constitutionality of the
law. 206 Under such review, the state must show that the law was justified
by a compelling state interest and that the means employed by the state
were necessary to achieve the compelling state objective. 207 The drugtesting policies in Vernonia and Earls would have failed to meet this
burden if the Court had previously recognized a fundamental right to a
minimally adequate education that encompassed extracurricular
activities. The policy would be struck down because there are several
means of reducing drug use among schoolchildren that are less
burdensome to the fundamental right. 208
Drug policies like those in Earls and Vernonia should pass the first
prong of "strict scrutiny" analysis because a state's interest in deterring
drug use by schoolchildren may be fairly characterized as a compelling
state interest. 209 Such policies, however, are unacceptable under the
second prong of judicial inquiry. While a school district's interest in
deterring drug use may be considered compelling, a suspicionless drugtesting regime that has the effect of turning away students, whether or
not they use drugs, is not the least intrusive means of achieving its
desired end. 210
In fact, such testing may actually undermine a district's effort to
combat student drug use. Empirical studies reveal that those who are not
involved in extracurricular activities are 49 percent more likely to have
used drugs than those who are involved. 211 Thus, a school district seeking
to decrease drug use among its students should be promoting student
participation in extracurricular activities, not restricting access to them.
There would be several ways to deter student drug use without
infringing on a fundamental right to education. A school district, for
example, could make an increased effort to encourage extracurricular
involvement while implementing a drug education/prevention
program. 212 Extracurricular activities offer students a wide array of

206. See Rodgiguez, 411 U.S at 17-19.
207. Id.
208. See Dunn, 405 U.S. at 343 ("[I] f there are other, reasonable ways to achieve [the
compelling state interest] with a lesser burden on constitutionally protected activity, a State may not
choose the way of greater interference. If it acts at all, it must choose 'less drastic means."') (quoting
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479,488 (1960)).
209. See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 661.
210. The Earls majority acknowledged that there was not a tight tlt between testing students in
extracurricular activities and solving the school's drug problems. 536 U.S. at 837-38.
211. Zill, supra n. 4.
212. There are additional alternatives, although some can be controversial, that can reduce
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benefits, 213 including decreasing the likelihood that participants will use
drugs. 214 As such, a school district should be promoting student
participation in extracurricular activities instead of restricting access to
them. A district might choose to offer a broader range of activities to
appeal to more students. In addition, a district might encourage
participation by holding award ceremonies to honor those who excel in
each activity offered.
A school district also has the option of infusing a drug prevention
program into its curriculum. One effective plan is Project Alert, which
focuses on preventing the use of alcohol, tobacco, and marijuana among
middle school students. 215 The program curriculum seeks to modify
norms about drug use, give students reasons not to use drugs, and teach
students to build resistance skills. 216 Students receiving the Project Alert
curriculum are 30 percent less likely to start using marijuana. 217 A drug
prevention program like Project Alert offers a less burdensome
alternative to mandatory drug testing to districts seeking to address
substance abuse among their students. By implementing this method,
schools would be combating drug use through education, rather than
attempting to achieve that same goal by erecting barriers to student
development.
In sum, if the Supreme Court recognizes a federal fundamental right
to a minimally adequate education that includes extracurricular activities,
schoolchildren will have an effective means to challenge school policies
that interfere with that right regardless of the state in which they attend
school. While deterring drug use is a noble and compelling cause, a
school district that wishes to do so must not unnecessarily infringe upon
students' protected rights to a minimally adequate education.

drug use among schoolchildren without infringing upon a child's right to a minimally adequate
education. See Cal. Dept. of)., Creating a Drug Free Zone <http://www.stopdrugs.org/drugfreezone.
html> (accessed Sept. 8, 2003) (discussing what drug free school zones are, why there should be such
zones, and strategies for starting them); Libertarian Party, Should We Re-Legalize Drugs?
<http://www.lp.org/issues/relegalize.html> (accessed )an. 14, 2004) (discussing how drug laws
increase crime, make civil liberties suffer, and create a black market where organized crime
prospers).
213. Sec supra Part I.
214. Zill, supra n. 4.
215. See generally Project
Alert:
Substance Abuse
Prevention
that
Works!
<http://www.projectalert.best.org> (accessed Sept. 8, 2003). A plan known as Alert Plus is currently
being developed I(Jr use in high schools. RAND Health, Research Highlights: Helping Adolescents
Resist Drugs <http://www.rand.org/publications/RB/RB4518.1/> (accessed )an. 14, 2004).
216.
217.
(accessed
who have

RAND Health, supra n. 215.
See id. Project Alert Brochure <http://www.projectalert.best.org/pdfs/overview.pdf>
)an. 15, 2004). The Project Alert curriculum also decreases marijuana use among those
starting using by 60 percent. Id.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Extracurricular activities provide students with countless benefits,m
yet a disturbing line of Supreme Court cases has allowed schools to
restrict certain students' access to these vital educational opportunities.m
Even so, the Court has specifically left open the question of whether there
is some level of education that is protected by the Constitution. 2211 In
Lawrence v. Texas, the Court exhibited a new willingness to broaden the
liberties deemed fundamental under the Due Process Clause. 221 The right
to a minimally adequate education should be deemed fundamental for
two reasons. First, a fundamental right to education is implicit in several
rights that are enumerated in the Constitution. 222 Second, the right may
be considered "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition." 221
The Lawrence decision shows that the Court is now more likely to
recognize a fundamental right to a minimally adequate education. This
right should encompass extracurricular activities, which play a significant
role in a student's education. 224 If this fundamental right were
recognized, policies such as those in Earls and Vernonia could be
declared unconstitutional under a substantive due process challenge
because such policies unnecessarily interfere with a student's
fundamental right to a minimally adequate education. 225
Now is the time for the Supreme Court to recognize a fundamental
right to a minimally adequate education so that the education of children
in this country will be protected from the intrusions sanctioned and
made possible by the Vernonia and Earls decisions.
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